Testing for Software Safety by Xu, Dianxiang et al.
Testing for Software Safety
OSMA Software Assurance Symposium 2007
Ken Chen, JSC
Yann-Hang Lee, ASU
W. Eric Wong, UT-Dallas
Dianxiang Xu, North Dakota State University
September, 2007
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070031170 2019-08-30T01:40:30+00:00Z
2SAS_07_Testing_for_Software_Safety_Chen_Lee_Wong_Xu
Objective
y This research focuses on testing whether or not the hazardous conditions identified 
by design-level fault tree analysis will occur in the target implementation.
– Part 1: Integrate fault tree models into functional specifications so as to identify testable 
interactions between intended behaviors and hazardous conditions. 
– Part 2: Develop a test generator that produces not only functional tests but also safety 
tests for a target implementation in a cost-effective way
– Part 3: Develop a testing environment for executing generated functional and safety tests 
and evaluating test results against expected behaviors or hazardous conditions. It includes 
a test harness as well as an environment simulation of external events and conditions. 
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Current Work
y Goal
– Integration of results from hazard analysis in fault trees with functional specifications in
UML behavior state machines
y Challenges
– Identify testable interactions between intended behaviors and hazardous conditions 
– Resolve the mismatch between fault tree models and functional specifications
 Some events or unsafe states in a fault tree model may not be found or may have 
no relevant parts in the corresponding functional specifications
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UML Behavioral State Machines
y A UML behavioral state machine can be used to specify the sequences of states an 
object goes through during its lifetime in response to events, together with its 
responses to those events. 
y The behavioral state machine formalism described in UML is an object-based 
variant of Harel statecharts
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
y Useful for reliability and safety analysis
– First used by Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection with the safety analysis of the 
Minuteman missile launch control system in 1962
y A top-down approach starting with an undesirable event called a top event and 
then determining all the ways it can happen
– Identify all the top events to be analyzed
– Identify the events that directly contribute to the top level vent
– Continue this process until the lowest level defined or basic level is reached
y Important because if there is a critical failure mode, then all possible ways that 
mode could occur must be discovered
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Fault Tree (FT)
y A fault tree is a graphical model of various parallel and sequential combinations of 
faults that will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired event
– The undesired event constitutes the top event in a fault tree constructed for the system, 
and generally consists of a complete, or catastrophic failure 
– The faults can be events that are associated with component hardware failures, human 
errors, or any other pertinent events which can lead to the top event
y A fault tree is composed of a number of “event” symbols and “gate” symbols 
– An event symbol serves to  represent an initiating fault event, an event that is normally 
expected to occur, a condition or restriction, or a fault event which occurs because of one 
or more antecedent causes acting through logic gates 
– A gate serves to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic up the tree, and shows the 
relationships of events needed for the occurrence of a higher event
 The higher event is the output of the gate
 The lower events are the inputs to the gate
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Events of Fault Tree
y Primary Event
– Basic event: An event does not require any further development in order to initiate a fault
 Fault tree symbol:
– Conditioning event: An event describes specific conditions or restrictions that apply to any logic gate
 Fault tree symbol: 
 Used primarily with PRIORITY AND and INHIBIT gates
– Undeveloped event: An event which is not further developed because it is of insufficient consequence 
or because information is not available
 Fault tree symbol: 
– External event: An event which is normally expected to occur
 Fault tree symbol:
y Intermediate Event
– An event that occurs because of one or more antecedent causes acting through logic gates
 Fault tree symbol: 
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Gates of Fault Tree
y AND-Gate
– Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur
– Fault tree symbol:
y OR-Gate
– Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occurs
– Fault tree symbol:
y EXCLUSIVE OR-Gate
– Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults occurs
– Fault tree symbol:
y PRIORITY AND-Gate
– Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a specific sequence (the sequence is represented 
by a CONDITIONING EVENT drawn to the right of the gate)
– Fault tree symbol:
y INHIBIT-Gate
– Output fault occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the presence of an enabling condition (the 
enabling condition is represented by a CONDITIONING EVENT drawn to the right of the gate)
– Fault tree symbol:
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Examples of Gates (1)
y AND-Gate relationship with dependency explicitly shown
y Inhibit-Gate: event Q occurs only if input A occurs under the condition specified by input B
Q occurs
A occurs
B occurs given 
the occurrence 
of A
B occurs
A occurs given 
the occurrence 
of B
(event Q)
(conditional input B)
(input A)
Frozen 
gasoline line
Existence of 
low 
temperature T
T < TCRITICAL
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Examples of Gates (2)
y The INHIBIT-Gate is a special case of the AND-Gate. The output is caused by a single input, but some 
qualifying condition must be satisfied before the input can produce the output
y The EXCLUSIVE OR-Gate is a special case of the OR-Gate in which the output event occurs only if 
exactly one of the input events occurs
y The PRIORITY AND-Gate is a special case of the AND-Gate in which the output event occurs if all input 
events occur in a specified ordered sequence
Q
A B
Q
A B
A and B occur 
exclusively
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Construction of Fault Tree
y A fault tree can be constructed based on the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) and system block diagrams
y Rules of thumb
– No Miracles Rule: If the normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, 
then it is assumed that the component functions normally.
– Complete-the-Gate Rule: All inputs to a particular gate should be completely defined 
before further analysis of any of them is undertaken.
– No Gate-to-Gate Rule: Gate inputs should be properly defined fault events, and the gates 
should not be directly connected to other gates.
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Boolean Algebra & Fault Tree Analysis
y The OR-Gate is equivalent to the Boolean symbol “+”
y The AND-Gate is equivalent to the Boolean symbol “•”
y Rules of Boolean Algebra
 Mathematical Symbolism Engineering Symbolism Designation 
(1a) =X Y Y XI I  ⋅ = ⋅X Y Y X  
(1b) =X Y Y XU U  + = +X Y Y X  
Commutative Law 
(2a) ( ) ( )=X Y Z X Y ZI I I I  ( ) ( )⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅X Y Z X Y Z  
( ) ( )=X YZ XY Z  
(2b) ( ) ( )=X Y Z X Y ZU U U U  ( ) ( )+ + = + +X Y Z X Y Z  
Associative Law 
(3a) ( ) ( ) ( )=X Y Z X Y X ZI U I U I  ( ) ( ) ( )⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅X Y Z X Y X Z  
( )+ = +X Y Z XY XZ  
(3b) ( ) ( ) ( )=X Y Z X Y X ZU I U I U  ( ) ( )+ ⋅ = + ⋅ +X Y Z X Y X Z  
Distributive Law 
(4a) =X X XI  ⋅ =X X X  
(4b) =X X XU  + =X X X  
Idempotent Law 
(5a) ( ) =X X Y XI U  ( )⋅ + =X X Y X  
(5b) ( ) =X X Y XU I  + ⋅ =X X Y X  
Law of Absorption 
(6a) φ′ =X XI  φ′⋅ =X X  
(6b) ′ = Ω =X X IU * ′+ = Ω =X X I  
(6c) ( )′ ′ =X X  ( )′ ′ =X X  
Complementation 
(7a) ( )′ ′ ′=X Y X YI U  ( )′ ′ ′⋅ = +X Y X Y  
(7b) ( )′ ′ ′=X Y X YU I  ( )′ ′ ′+ = ⋅X Y X Y  
de Morgan’s Theorem 
(8a) φ φ=XI  φ φ⋅ =X  
(8b) φ =X XU  φ + =X X  
(8c) Ω =X XI  Ω⋅ =X X  
(8d) Ω = ΩXU  Ω+ = ΩX  
(8e) φ′ = Ω  φ′ = Ω  
(8f) φ′Ω =  φ′Ω =  
Operations withφ andΩ  
(9a) ( )′ =X X Y X YU I U  ′+ ⋅ = +X X Y X Y  
(9b) ( ) ( )′ ′ ′ ′ ′= =X X Y X Y X YI U I U  ( ) ( )′ ′ ′ ′ ′⋅ + = ⋅ = +X X Y X Y X Y  
These relationships are 
unnamed but are frequently 
useful in the reduction process. 
_______________ 
* The symbol I is often used instead ofΩ to designate the Universal Set. In engineering notationΩ is 
often replaced by 1 andφ  by 0. 
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Examples of Fault Trees
y Fault tree structure for D=A · (B+C)
y An equivalent fault tree for D=A · (B+C)
D
A B or C
B C
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y A cut set in a fault tree is a set of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence 
ensures that the top event occurs.
y A cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be reduced without losing its status 
as a cut set.
– The combination is “smallest” in that all the events are needed for the top event to occur. 
If one of the events in the cut set does not occur, then the top event will not occur (by this 
combination).
y A fault tree may consist of a finite number of minimal cut sets, which are unique 
for that top event.
Minimal Cut Set (1)
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y The one-event minimal cut sets represent those single events which will cause the 
top event to occur
y The two-event minimal cut sets represent those pairs of events which together will 
cause the top event to occur
y Similarly, for an n-event minimal cut set, all n events in the cut set must occur in 
order for the top event to occur
y The minimal cut set for the top-event can be written in the following general form
– TOP = M1 + M2 + ··· + Mm where TOP is the top event and Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a minimal cut 
set
– Mi = X1 • X2 • ··· • Xn where Xk (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is a basic event in the fault tree
Minimal Cut Set (2)
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Examples of Minimal Cut Sets
y The top event can be expressed as 
a Boolean function of the basic events
E1 = T + E2 
= T + (K2 + E3)
= T + K2 + (S · E4)
= T + K2 + (S · (S1 + E5))
= T + K2 + (S · S1) + (S · E5)
= T + K2 + (S · S1) + S · (K1 + R)
= T + K2 + (S · S1) + S · K1 + S · R
y The above expression of the top event 
in terms of the basic events to the tree 
can be viewed as a Boolean algebraic 
equivalent of the tree itself.
y In this example, we have five minimal 
cut sets ― two singles and three doubles
– K2
– T
– S · S1
– S · K1
– S · R
E1
T E2
E3 K2
S E4
S1 E5
K1 R
Top Event
Intermediate Event
Intermediate 
Event
Intermediate Event
Intermediate 
Event
Basic Event
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Construction of Minimal Cut Set
y The tree is first translated to its equivalent Boolean equations and then either the 
“top-down” or “bottom-up” substitution method is used. 
– Both methods involve substituting and expanding Boolean expressions.
– Two Boolean laws, the distributive law and the law of absorption, are used to remove the 
redundancies.
[Reference 3]
y Tools are available for computing the minimal cut sets of a fault tree
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y The occurrence of basic events in a minimal cut set M will lead to the occurrence 
of an undesired event and finally cause a transition from a normal state to a fault 
state. We define such a transition as a minimal cut set transition.
y Given a fault tree T and a minimal cut set M, we can obtain a subtree, whose root 
is the top event of the fault tree, and whose leaves are the basic events in M and 
some other primary events (e.g., external events) that cause the top event. 
– The subtree contains
 all the basic events in M (the given minimal cut set)
 all the other necessary “occurring” primary events (undeveloped, external, and conditioning 
events)
 all the necessary “occurring” intermediate events
 the top event
y A subtree therefore describes a minimal cut set transition in the behavioral state 
machine
Minimal Cut Set Transition
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y How to simplify a fault tree by deleting all the infeasible and non-causal events 
and gates?
– A fault tree may be constructed independently from the construction of the UML 
behavior state machine for the target system. Some constraints, which are defined 
implicitly or explicitly on the system or on the machine, may affect the occurrence of the 
primary and/or non-primary events in the fault tree. How to use these constraints to 
simplify the fault tree in order to reduce the complexity of the machine after 
combination? 
– Proposed Solution
y Given a minimal cut set of a fault tree, how to construct a corresponding subtree 
which covers all necessary events leading to the top event? 
– Proposed Solution
y How to transform a subtree to a minimal cut set transition?
– Proposed Solution
y How to add the minimal cut set transitions to a UML behavior state machine?
– Proposed Solution
Research Issues
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Research Issue I
Simplify a fault tree by deleting all the infeasible
and non-causal events and gates
Back to Research Issues
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Infeasible Minimal Cut Set (Transition)
y Theoretically, we can transform the subtrees for the minimal cut sets to minimal 
cut set transitions, and then extend the UML behavior state machine to describe the 
possibilities of the occurrence of undesired events by adding all minimal cut set 
transitions to the machine.
y A minimal cut set transition can be infeasible because of the restrictions on a 
specific system. These restrictions are implicitly or explicitly defined, which make 
the transition impossible to traverse. We call such a transition an “infeasible”
minimal cut set transition, and the corresponding minimal cut set is an “infeasible”
minimal cut set. 
– On the contrary, we have “feasible” minimal cut sets and “feasible” minimal cut set 
transitions.
y Identification of “infeasible” minimal cut sets beforehand can 
– reduce the complexity of the UML behavior state machine after combination
– help the derivation of traversable test sequences and generation of effective test cases 
from the combined machine
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Bottom-Up Path
y We define a bottom-up path p = <x1, x2, …, xn>
from x1 to xn, where xi (1≤ i ≤ n) is an event or 
a gate in the fault tree
y The path needs to satisfy the following:
– The adjacent events/gates on the path are 
connected by a line in the fault tree
– If xi is a gate, xi-1 is an input event of xi
or a conditioning event applied to xi, 
and xi+1 is the output event of xi
– If xi is an event, xi+1 can be the successive 
event of xi or a gate receiving xi as its input 
y A bottom-up path gives the order of 
the occurrence of the events
RUPTURE OF PRESSURE TANK 
AFTER THE START OF PUMPING
TANK RUPTURE 
(SECONDARY 
FAILURE)TANK 
RUPTURE
TANK RUPTURE DUE TO 
IMPROPER SELECTION OF 
INSTALLATION 
(WRONG TANK)
TANK RUPTURE DUE TO INTERNAL OVER-
PRESSURE CAUSED BY CONTINUOUS  PUMP 
OPERATION FOR t>60 SEC SECONDARY TANK FAILURE 
FROM OTHER OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE CONDITIONS (e.g., 
MECHANICAL, THERMAL)
IF PUMP RUNS FOR t>60 
SECS, TANK WILL RUPTURE 
WITH PROBABILITY = 1
PUMP OPERATES 
CONTINUOUSLY 
FOR t>60 SEC
K2 RELAY CONTACTS 
REMAIN CLOSED FOR t>60 
SEC
K2 RELAY 
(SECONDARY 
FAILURE)
K2 RELAY 
CONTACTS 
FAIL TO OPEN
EMF APPLIED TO K2 
RELAY COIL FOR t>60 
SEC
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Identification of Infeasible Events & Gates (1)
y A primary/non-primary event with unrealistic constraints is infeasible
– Example: an event “a sportsman jumps for a distance of ten meters” can be regarded as 
an infeasible event because a human being cannot jump that far
y A conditioning event is infeasible if the condition specified in the event can never
be reached or the probability specified in the event is 0
y A gate is infeasible if it cannot be passed through based on the combinations of all 
its input events
– Example: an AND-Gate I = E1 • E2 but events E1 and E2 cannot occur simultaneously 
because they contradict each other
– Example: an OR-Gate I = E1 + E2 but neither E1 nor E2 can occur
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Identification of Infeasible Events & Gates (2)
y If any of the input events of an AND-Gate is infeasible, then the AND-gate is 
infeasible
y If all the input events of an OR-Gate are infeasible, then the OR-Gate is infeasible
y A gate is infeasible if its conditioning event is infeasible
y The output event of an infeasible gate is infeasible
y The successive event of an infeasible event is infeasible
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Identification of Non-Causal Events & Gates
y A non-causal event/gate does not contribute to the occurrence of the top event
– The Boolean equations for the following tree are TOP = I1• I2; I1 = E1 • I3; I2 = E2 • I4; I3 = E2 • E3 • E4; 
I4=[C1] (E6 • E7 • E8). Suppose the conditioning event C1 is infeasible (cannot occur), the 
corresponding AND-gate is infeasible which makes the intermediate event I4 infeasible. Although the 
top event can still occur if E1 and E5 occur. Basic events E6, E7, and E8 have no impact on the 
occurrence of the top event. They are defined as “non-causal” events.
– If there does not exist a bottom-up path from an event E (or a gate G) to the top event, on 
which all the events/gates are feasible, then E (or G) is a non-causal event (or gate) for 
the top event.
C1 is an infeasible conditioning event
E6, E7, and E8 are non-causal events
X
X X
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y A fault tree can be simplified by removing all the infeasible and non-causal events 
and gates
– In the following tree, events E3, I4, and C1 are infeasible and events E6, E7, and E8 are non-causal
y If the top event is infeasible, the fault tree can be excluded from further 
consideration.
Simplification of a Fault Tree
Back to Research Issues
• X: the event/gate is infeasible according to 
some constraints on the system
•X: the event/gate is infeasible according to 
some deduction rules
•X: the event/gate is a non-causal event/gate.X
X
X X XX
X
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Research Issue 2
Construct a subtree based on a given minimal cut set
Back to Research Issues
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Construction of a Subtree for a Given Minimal Cut Set (1)
y A subtree for a minimal cut set M can be obtained by simulating the occurrence 
of all the basic events in M
– Step 0: Assuming each event in a simplified fault tree can be classified as “occurring”
or “non-occurring”, and each gate can be classified as “passed through” or 
“not-passed through”
– Step 1: Initially, mark all the events in the fault tree as “non-occurring” and all the
gates as “not-passed through”
– Step 2: Mark a “non-occurring” basic event as “occurring” if it belongs to M
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Construction of a Subtree for a Given Minimal Cut Set (2)
– Step 3: Repeat steps 3.1 to 3.4 until no events in the fault tree can be marked as 
“occurring” and no gates can be marked as “passed through”
 Step 3.1: Mark an external/undeveloped event E as “occurring” if E is an input of an 
AND-Gate G and all other basic events and intermediate events received by G are “occurring”
 Step 3.2: Mark the conditioning event C applied to a gate G as “occurring” if the “occurring”
input events can satisfy the conditions indicated in C
occurring events
occurring events
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Construction of a Subtree for a Given Minimal Cut Set (3)
 Step 3.3: Mark a non-primary event E as “occurring” if E is the output of a “passed through” gate
G or E is the successive event of an “occurring” event
 Step 3.4: Mark a “not-passed through” gate G as “passed through” if 
¾ G is an OR-Gate, and at least one of its input events is “occurring”, and the applied conditioning event, if it 
exists, is also “occurring”
¾ G is an AND-Gate, and all of its input events are “occurring”, and the applied conditioning event, if it exists, 
is also “occurring”
– Step 4: Identify additional non-causal events and gates with respect to the given 
minimal cut set which are not removed during the simplification of the fault 
tree (as discussed earlier)
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Construction of a Subtree for a Given Minimal Cut Set (4)
 Change an “occurring” event to “non-causal” and a “passed through” gate to “non-causal” if there 
does not exist a bottom-up path from the event/gate to the top event, on which all events are 
marked as “occurring” and all gates are marked as “passed through”
– Step 5: Remove all “non-occurring”/“non-causal” events and all “not-passed through”/ 
“non-causal” gates from the fault tree
Let the minimal cut set M = {E1, E2}
When basic events E1 and E2 occur, 
intermediate events I1 and I3 will occur.
Since basic event E3 is not in M,
it will not be included in the subtree for M.
That is, E3 is regarded as “infeasible” with respect 
to this subtree.
As a result, I2 cannot occur which makes E1 and 
E2 in the right part of the tree as “non-causal”. 
It is better to represent such E1 and E2 as the 
mirror blocks of the E1 and E2 in the left part of 
the fault tree. Note that an event may appear 
multiple times at different places in a fault tree 
and affect different parts of the tree. [Reference 1]
occurring non-occurring
occurring
occurringoccurring non-
occurring
occurring occurring
occurring
Î non-causal Î non-causal
Î non-causal
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y The subtree constructed at step 5 contains
– all the basic events in M (the given minimal cut set)
– all the other necessary “occurring” primary events (undeveloped, external, and conditioning events)
– all the necessary “occurring” intermediate events
– the top event
Subtree-events (M) = M ∪ {other necessary “occurring” primary events} ∪
{necessary “occurring” intermediate events} ∪ {top event}
– The subtree for a given M does not contain any basic events that are not in M
– The top event of a fault tree must be included in the subtree
Characteristics of the Subtree
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Examples of Two Subtrees
y The equivalent Boolean equations for the 
fault tree to the right is
– TOP = I1 + I2
– I1 = E1 • E2
– I2 = E3 • E4
y Let minimal cut set M1 = {E1, E2} 
– Subtree-events (M1) = M1∪{I1} ∪{TOP} 
– The equivalent Boolean equations for subtree 1
 T = I1
 I1 = E1 • E2
y Let minimal cut set M2 = {E3, E4} 
– Subtree-events (M2) = M2∪{I2} ∪{TOP}
– The equivalent Boolean equations for subtree 2
 T = I2
 I2 = E3 • E4
Subtree for the minimal cut set M1
Subtree for the minimal cut set M2
Back to Research Issues
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Research Issue 3
Transform a subtree to a minimal cut set transition
Back to Research Issues
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Run-to-Completion Assumption
y The semantics of event occurrence processing in UML is based on the run-to-
completion assumption, interpreted as run-to-completion processing. 
– Run-to-completion processing means that an event occurrence can only be taken from the 
event pool and dispatched if the processing of the previous occurrence is fully completed. 
[Reference 2] 
y Assume that the event occurrence processing in a fault tree is also based on the 
run-to-completion assumption.
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y A primary event of a fault tree can be transformed to a trigger or a guard 
condition for a transition in a UML behavioral state machine.
– The occurrence of a basic/undeveloped/external event in a fault tree is semantically 
equivalent to triggering a transition in a UML behavior state machine
– Event E may be prevented from occurring or its effect can be eliminated
A Primary Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (1)
Idle
invoke E
• • • • •
Idle
E is invoked
processing E
Effect of E is not eliminated
Effect of E is eliminated
E is prevented from occurring
invoke E
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A Primary Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (2)
– A conditioning event can be transformed to a transition guard
 Example: 
¾ Fault Tree: T < T_CRITICAL
¾ UML behavior state machine: [T < T_CRITICAL]
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (1)
y An intermediate event of a fault tree can be transformed to an action in a UML 
behavior state machine
y Event E may be prevented from occurring or its effect can be eliminated
Processing lower level events Processing E
lower level events occur 
/ invoke E
Processing lower level events Idle
Processing E
lower level events occur 
/ invoke E
E is invoked
Effect of E is not eliminated
Effect of E is eliminated
E is prevented from occurring
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (2)
y Example: I = I1 • I2
Processing IIdle_I
Processing I1 and I2
Idle_I2 Processing I2
/ invoke I
I is invoked
Effect of I is not eliminatedEffect of I is eliminated
I1 is invoked
Effect of I1 is not eliminated
I2 is invoked
Effect of I2 is not eliminated
I1 is prevented from occurring
Idle_I1 Processing I1
Effect of I1 is eliminated
I is prevented from occurring
I2 is prevented from occurring
Effect of I2 is eliminated
invoke I1
invoke I2
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (3)
y Example 2: I = I1 + I2
Processing I1 and I2
Idle_I2
Processing I2
Processing IIdle_I
I is invoked
Effect of I is not eliminated
Effect of I is eliminated
I1 is invoked
I2 is invoked
I1 is prevented from occurring
Idle_I1 Processing I1
Effect of I1 is eliminated I is prevented from occurring
I2 is prevented from occurring
Effect of I2 is eliminated
Effect of I1 is not eliminated
Effect of I2 is not eliminated
/ invoke I
invoke I1
invoke I2
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (4)
y Example 3: I = [C] I1 /*    if (I1 occurs under the condition C) {I occurs}    */ 
Processing I1
Idle_I1 Processing I1
Processing IIdle_I
[ C ] / invoke I
I is invoked
Effect of I is not eliminatedEffect of I is eliminated
I1 is invoked
Effect of I1 is not eliminated
I1 is prevented from occurring
Effect of I1 is eliminated
I is prevented from occurring
invoke I1
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (5)
y Example 4: I = [C] (I1 • I2) /*   if (I1 and I2 occur under the condition C) {I occurs}   */
Processing IIdle_I
Processing I1 and I2
Idle_I2 Processing I2
[ C ] / invoke I
I is invoked
Effect of I is not eliminatedEffect of I is eliminated
I1 is invoked
Effect of I1 is not eliminated
I2 is invoked
Effect of I2 is not eliminated
I1 is prevented from occurring
Idle_I1 Processing I1
Effect of I1 is eliminated
I is prevented from occurring
I2 is prevented from occurring
Effect of I2 is eliminated
invoke I1
invoke I2
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An Intermediate Event in a UML Behavior State Machine (6)
y Example 5:  I = [C] (I1 + I2) /*   if  (I1 or I2 occur under the condition C) {I occurs}  */
Processing I1 and I2
Idle_I2
Processing I2
Processing IIdle_I
I is invoked
Effect of I is not eliminated
Effect of I is eliminated
I1 is invoked
I2 is invoked
I1 is prevented from occurring
Idle_I1 Processing I1
Effect of I1 is eliminated I is prevented from occurring
I2 is prevented from occurring
Effect of I2 is eliminated
Effect of I1 is not eliminated
Effect of I2 is not eliminated
[ C ] / invoke I
invoke I1
invoke I2
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Minimal Cut Set Transition: Example 1 
y A subtree for a given minimal cut set M can be transformed to a minimal cut set transition
y The Boolean equations for the following subtree are I = I1 · I2; I1 = E1 · E2; I2 = E3 · E4
Processing I1 and I2
Processing E1 and E2
Processing E1
Processing E2
Processing I1
Processing E3 and E4
Processing E3
Processing E4
Processing I/ invoke I
/ invoke I2 Processing I2
/ invoke I1
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Minimal Cut Set Transition: Example 1 (cont’d)
P rocessing I1 and I2
P rocessing E1 and E2
P rocessing E1
Idel_E1 P rocessing E1
P rocessing E2
Idle_E2
Processing E2
P rocessing E3 and E4
P rocessing E3
Idle_E3 P rocessing E3
P rocessing E4
Idle_E4 P rocessing E4
Processing I1
Idle_I1 P rocessing I1
P rocessing I2
Idle_I2 P rocessing I2
P rocessing I
Idle_I Processing I
/ Invoke I
/ Invoke I2
/ Invoked I1
E1 is invoked
Effect  of E1 is not  eliminated
E2 is invoked
Effect  of E2 is not  eliminated
E3 is invoked
Effect  of E3 is not  eliminated
E4 is invoked
Effect  of E4 is not  eliminated
I1 is invoked
Effect  of I1 is not  eliminated
I2 is invoked
Effect  of I2 is not  eliminated
I is invoked
Effect  of I is not  eliminat ed
Effect  of E1 is eliminated
Effect  of I1 is eliminated
Effect  of E2 is eliminated
Effect  of E3 is eliminated
Effect  of E4 is eliminat ed
Effect  of I2 is eliminated
Effect  of I is eliminated
E1 is prevented from occurring
E2 is prevented from occurring
I1 is prevented from occurring
E3 is prevented from occurring
E4 is prevented from occurring
I2 is prevented from occurring
I is prevented from occurring
invoke E1
invoke E2
Invoke E3
invoke E4
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Minimal Cut Set Transition: Example 2
y The Boolean equations for the following subtree are I = I1 · I2; I1 = E1 · E2; I2 = E1 · E3
Processing I1 and I2
Processing E1 and E2
Processing E1
Processing E2
Processing I1
Processing E1 and E3
Processing E1
Processing E3
Processing I/ invoke I
/ invoke I2 Processing I2
/ invoke I1Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Event E1 appears twice – once in Region 1 and once in Region 3 
Back to Research Issues
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Research Issue 4
Add minimal cut set transitions to 
a UML behavior state machine
Back to Research Issues
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System
Processing events
Processing events
Processing events
Processing TOP
Processing TOP
Processing TOP
fault state
/ invoke TOPevents in M1 are invoked
/ invoke TOPevents in M2 are invoked
/ invoke TOPevents in Mk are invoked
Original UML behavioral state machine
y Suppose a system has one undesired failure represented by the top event of a corresponding fault 
tree
y Suppose the top event TOP = M1 + M2 + ··· + Mk where Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a minimal cut set for the top 
event and Si is the corresponding subtree (as discussed before) for Mi
y We combine the original UML behavioral state machine and the fault tree by adding fault regions to 
the original machine, each of which contains a minimal cut set transition to a fault state
Combination of UML Machines & Fault Trees (1)
normal behavior
undesired behavior
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Combination of UML Machines & Fault Trees (2)
y All regions work in parallel. If any of the undesired regions reaches the fault state 
before the system terminates normally, then the system is not safe. 
y If the system keeps running (i.e., never stops), then the system is not safe if the 
fault state can be reached from any of the fault regions. 
y The same approach applies to a system with multiple undesired failures
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A Gas Burner System (1)
y It consists of the following
– an on/off valve to feed air
– an on/off valve to feed fuel
– a flame igniter
– a flame detector
– a controller
y The objectives of the control system for the burner are to 
– start it up
– maintain it with an ignited flame
– shut it down when requested
– deal with abnormal and emergency conditions that may arise during operation
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A Gas Burner System (2)
y Original UML behavioral state machine
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A Gas Burner System (3)
y Boolean equations for the fault tree 
TOP = I1 + E5; I1 = E1 · I2 · E4; I2 = E2 · E3
y Minimal cut set M1={E5}
– Events in subtree S1= M1∪ {TOP}
– Boolean equations for S1: T=E5
y Minimal cut set M2={E2, E3}
– Events  in subtree S2= M2∪{E1, E4} 
∪{I1, I2} ∪{TOP}
– Boolean equations for S2: 
T = I1
I1 = E1 · I2 · E4
I2 = E2 · E3
TOP: Fire 
occurs
I1: Gas 
explodes
I2: Excess of 
gas present
E2: Gas 
leaks for 
more than 4 
secs
E3: 
Observation 
interval less 
than 30 secs
E5: 
Electricity 
short in
cables
E1: Air 
present
E4: 
Ignition 
attempted
TOP: Fire 
occurs
I1: Gas 
explodes
I2: Excess of 
gas present
E2: Gas 
leaks for 
more than 4 
secs
E3: 
Observation 
interval less 
than 30 secs
E5: 
Electricity 
short in
cables
E1: Air 
present
E4: 
Ignition 
attempted
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A Gas Burner System (4)
y Transform subtree S1 (for M1) to its corresponding minimal cut set transition
Processing TOP
Idle_TOP Processing_TOP
Processing E5
Idle_E5 Processing_E5
/ invoke TOP
E5 is invoked
Effect of E5 is not eliminated
TOP is invoked
Effect of TOP is not eliminated
E5 is prevented from occurring
Effect of E5 is eliminated
TOP is prevented from occurring
Effect of TOP is eliminated
E5 is invoked
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A Gas Burner System (5)
y Transform subtree S2 (for M2) to its corresponding minimal cut set transition
Processing I1
Processing I1
Idle_I1 Processing_I1
Processing E1, I1 and E4
Idle_E1 Processing_E1
Idle_E4 Processing_E4
Process ing E2 and E3
Idle_E2
Processing_E2
Idle_E3 Process ing_E3
Process ing I2
Processing_I2Idle_I2
/ invoke I1
E1 is  invoked
Effect of E1 is  not eliminated
I1 is  invoked
effect of I1 is  not eliminated
E1 is  prevented from occurring
Effect of E1 is  eliminated
I1 is  prevented from occurring
effect of I1 is  eliminated
E4 is  prevented from occurring
Effect of E4 is  not eliminated
E4 is  invoked
Effect of E4 is  eliminated
I2 is  invoked
Effect of I2 is  eliminated
Effect of I2 is  not eliminated
I2 is  prevented from occurring
Processing TOP
Idle_TOP Process ing_TOP
TOP is  invoked
Effect of TOP is  not eliminated
TOP is  prevented from occurring
Effect of TOP is  eliminated
E2 is  invoked
E3 is  invoked
effect of E2 is  not eliminated
Effect of E3 is  not eliminated
/ Invoke I2
Effect of E2 is  eliminated
Effect of E3 is  eliminated
E2 is  prevented from occurring
E3 is  prevented from occurring
/ Invoke TOP
invoke E4
invoke E3
invoke E1
invoke E2
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A Gas Burner System (6)
y Add feasible minimal cut set transitions to the original behavioral state machine.
Minimal cut set transition for M1
Minimal cut set transition for M2 Fault state
undesired behavior
normal behavior
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Conclusion
y Successfully developed a solution to integrate functional specifications in UML 
behavior state machines and hazard analysis in fault trees 
y Writing a comprehensive report due on 12/31/2007
